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Essay
The Special Kay Defence of Non-Originalist Judges:
A Serial with an Unhealthy Final Ingredient
JAMES ALLAN
In this Article, the author considers Richard Kay’s views on constitutional
interpretation, the rule of recognition and how best to conceptualise top courts in
the common law world—courts that appear not to be engaged in constitutionalism,
or giving the legal text the meaning its legitimate authors intended. The author
notes that his views and Kay’s line up almost perfectly across these topics but, in
keeping with these commemorative special issues, he manages to pick a couple of
small fights with Kay’s views—one small quibble, a defence, and then a bigger
quibble.
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The Special Kay Defence of Non-Originalist Judges:
A Serial with an Unhealthy Final Ingredient
JAMES ALLAN *
INTRODUCTION
This Article is written in honor of my friend Richard (Rick) Kay as
part of this special issue dedicated to, and celebrating, his career and
writings. I am myself honored to have been asked to be a contributor, and I
thank the editor(s).
I first met Rick just over a quarter of a century ago. A native born
Canadian and not long married, I had gone from a large law firm in
Toronto to working at the Bar in London, England when over lunch in
Middle Temple I was offered a job at a brand new law school opening in
Hong Kong. At that point I had not really considered a career in legal
academia, but as something of a lark my wife and I opted to give it a go for
a couple of years. That was late 1989. A little over a year later I met Rick.
You see on my arrival at Hong Kong’s then City Polytechnic School of
Law (subsequently rebranded as the City University) the Dean of Law
handed me two compulsory law degree courses to teach, in all likelihood
because it was me or no one and he had had to make a tough call. One of
those courses was Hong Kong public law, which in a then colony of a
jurisdiction like the United Kingdom with an unwritten constitution,
translates more or less for Americans into the pre-1997 Hong Kong
constitutional law course. The other course was jurisprudence or legal
theory or legal philosophy (pick your favourite description), which was a
compulsory final year course. Over the years since, because I never ended
up going back to the practice of law, those two broad subject areas have
lain at the heart of my law teaching and academic publications. More to the
point of this introduction though, it was at some point during that very first
year of teaching the compulsory jurisprudence course that my then-Dean of
Law, Professor Derek Roebuck, called me into his office and told me that
this brand new little law school of ours would be co-hosting in Hong Kong
a rather grand law conference with the University of Connecticut School of
Law. The theme would be “Comparative Legal Theory: A Meeting of East
and West.” And despite what any observer would immediately have
noticed about this particular young Canadian who had yet to have lived
even a year in the Crown Colony of Hong Kong, the Dean informed me
*

Garrick Professor of Law, T.C. Beirne School of Law, University of Queensland, Australia.
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that as far as that upcoming meeting was concerned, I was to be in charge
of the eastern side of things. Luckily, I soon had help in the form of a
further recruit to our law school, David Campbell. Luckier still, it soon
became abundantly clear that this top class U.S. law school—nominally
our co-hosts but in reality the driving force behind the conference—had
matters well in hand. My job entailed little more than recruiting some good
speakers, a bit of housekeeping administration, and trying not to screw
things up. The real brains and driving forces behind what turned out to be
this really excellent legal theory conference were the two Connecticut law
school professors politely described as being in charge of “their side of
things.” They were Professor Mark Janis and Professor Richard Kay. And
the result of that very fine meeting of east and west was published as a
special issue of the Connecticut Journal of International Law.1
To give readers some context, that conference took place only shortly
after the coming down of the Berlin Wall and the events in Tiananmen
Square, with the collapse of the Soviet Union only months in the future.
And on meeting Rick Kay way back then one of the first things that struck
me was what a very nice man he was, a conviction that the many
intervening years have only strengthened. Moreover, having met the man
and read his conference article,2 I was spurred over the years to read more
(indeed almost all) of the Kay oeuvre. That too has been a pleasure, and
not just because I found (and continue to find) myself overwhelmingly in
agreement with Rick’s views. I also stumbled on little secrets, such as the
slow realization that Rick Kay is one of the best informed American legal
scholars alive today as far as understanding the Westminster constitutional
world is concerned.3 In fact, in my view he may well be tied for the best
1
See generally Symposium, Comparative Legal Theory: A Meeting of East and West, 6 CONN. J.
INT’L L. 295 (1991) (including authors Yash Ghai, Alice Erh-Soon Tay, C.G. Weeramantry, and
various City Polytechnic and University of Connecticut contributors including both Rick and me, as
well as the introductory remarks of the Attorney General of Hong Kong, the President of the Law
Society of Hong Kong, and both law deans).
2
Richard S. Kay, Comparative Constitutional Fundamentals, 6 CONN. J. INT’L L. 445, 445–46
(1991) (beginning by considering H.L.A. Hart’s “rule of recognition” and the questions surrounding
any jurisdiction’s ultimate test of legal validity. Kay agreeing with Hart (and me) that for any outside
observer “it is a product of some kind of social acceptance”). I will return to Rick’s concern with these
‘constitutional fundamentals’ or rules of recognitions below.
3
By ‘Westminster constitutional world’ I mean the constitutional arrangements of the United
Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and other former Dominions and Colonies of Britain that
inherited much from the constitutional arrangements centered on London’s Westminster Parliament.
See RICHARD S. KAY, THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION AND THE CONTINUITY OF LAW 12 (2014)
(exploring the “law and revolution” created by the 1688-1689 Glorious Revolution and its enduring
emotional appeal); James Allan, The Glorious Revolution & the Rule of Recognition, 30 CONST.
COMMENT. 509, 509–11 (2015) (reviewing Kay’s The Glorious Revolution and the Continuity of Law
and describing the three main ways—legal history; the importance of the law to the revolutionaries
themselves; and “applied legal philosophy”—in which Kay’s book “works” well); Richard S. Kay, The
Secession Reference and the Limits of Law, 10 OTAGO L. REV. 327, 327 (2003) (explaining the purpose
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informed and most knowledgeable such American scholar (with Maimon
Schwarzschild).
In this Article, in keeping with the general conventions that underlie
these celebratory law review special issues and despite the truth that I
agree with Rick on so many things and to such a significant extent, I am
going to do my best to pick a couple of fights with him. One will be a
small fight, no more than a quibble. The other one will be a slightly bigger
fight. In between I am going to defend Rick (well, perhaps three-quarters
defend him) on a minor matter related to his understanding of the Rule of
Recognition. So quibble, defend, bigger quibble—that is the program for
the rest of this Article.
I. THE QUIBBLE
Let me start with Rick Kay’s views on constitutional, statutory and
indeed any sort of interpretation.4 Rick is an old school originalist,
someone for whom the meaning of a text is found by seeking the empirical
fact of what the actual author or authors intended. This is sometimes
known as being an ‘original intended meaning’ (OIM) originalist to
distinguish it from the other, newer, more populated branch or school of
adherents often given the label of being ‘original public meaning’ (OPM)
originalists – and for whom the task is to find what the hypothetical
well-informed and reasonable person back at the time of writing would
have taken the document or provision to mean.5 Larry Alexander, writing
for Rick in this same celebratory special issue, gives a concise outline of

of the article as “to consider the best way to characterize what the [Canadian] Supreme Court did in the
Secession Reference,” when it “issued . . . judgment on the legality of ‘unilateral’ Quebec secession in
August 1998”); Richard S. Kay, Sovereignty in the New Hong Kong, 114 LAW Q. REV. 189 (1998)
(covering the post-handover of Hong Kong); Richard S. Kay, Judicial Policy-Making and the Peculiar
Function of Law, 26 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 237, 240 (2007) (noting that the United Kingdom is the
exception to many modern legal systems where “public law is almost always enacted law”; instead in
the U.K. “the legal system does not recognize a written, enacted, legally enforceable constitution that
creates and defines the scope of the law-making power”).
4
See Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three
Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 231 (1988) (stating “[i]n legal interpretation . . . we
are not interested in some abstract meaning of words but in the meaning of the utterance of those words
on a particular occasion”); Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional
Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 703, 704 (2009) (reexamining “the shift from the subjective intent
of the constitution-makers to the ‘original public meaning’ of the Constitution’s words”). See generally
Richard S. Kay, American Constitutionalism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
16–63 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998).
5
See THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, at ix
(Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011) (providing an excellent series of chapters on this split
as well as on other aspects of originalism, the authors of which include Stanley Fish, Mitchell N.
Berman, Larry Alexander, Keith E. Whittington, Lawrence B. Solum, and more).
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the OIM interpretation thesis. In fact Larry writes that as he “read[s]
Rick’s copious writings on the topic, [Rick] would agree with everything
[Larry has] said [about the topic]”;7 Larry goes so far as to say that his own
views and those of Rick’s as regards interpretation, including how judges
ought to interpret legal texts, align “jot and tittle.”8 In other words, there is
not the least difference between their two views in support of intentionalist
interpretation.9
And you could say virtually the exact same of me as regards to the
proper goal of legal interpretation. I am undoubtedly in the Kay/Alexander
OIM camp, in large part because of the powerful arguments put forward by
Rick and Larry. I agree with virtually everything they assert. So in pith and
substance, if not all the way down to the minutiae of jots and tittles, I am
with Rick. But here is the quibble. It arises in instances where someone
might have plausible grounds for thinking – say, for rule of law or the
expense of conducting the historical search or other such policy reasons –
that the search for evidence of authors’ intentions should in this case be
restricted. And notice that even Larry Alexander accepts that something
like this might on occasion be defensible,10 the choice being between i)
interpreters use all the evidence there is of authors’ intentions in the quest
to find the text’s meaning; and ii) a rule is laid down that restricts, for
various policy-based reasons, some of the evidence that can be sought by
the point-of-application interpreter. Of course, either choice you make will
have costs as well as benefits. Opt for ii) and you are conceding that other
things can matter too, not just a law’s meaning, especially where the
lawmaker has plenty of scope to try again and this time be clearer. More to
the point, option ii) has obvious costs in terms of the legitimate authority of
law and why people should obey not the law but this cost/benefit
evidence-restricting rule that will sometimes produce interpretive
outcomes different from the intended law, from what those with legitimate
6

See Larry Alexander, Connecting the Rule of Recognition and Intentionalist Interpretation: An
Essay in Honor of Richard Kay 9–15 (Univ. of San Diego Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper
Series, Paper No. 19-407, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=%203448695
(providing an overview of Richard Kay’s “original intended meaning” approach to constitutional
interpretation).
7
Id. at 15.
8
Id. at 11.
9
See id. at 1–2 n.2 (listing his, Alexander’s, own publications related to defending intentionalism
(OIM) as the most persuasive theory of what the meaning of a legal, and indeed any, text is); Stanley
Fish, The Intentionalist Thesis Once More, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 119 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011) (providing
yet another virtually identical view to those of Kay and Alexander stating “[t]he danger of irresponsibly
subjective interpretation – the danger of permitting anything to go – is courted the moment you depart
from the constraint of authorial intention and make something else, arbitrarily chosen, your target”).
10
See Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You’re Speaking?” Why Intention
Free Interpretation Is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967, 969–70 (2004) (describing how
different types of textual interpreters might restrict certain evidence depending on its reliability).

2021]

THE SPECIAL KAY DEFENCE

1535

law-making authority intended. Obversely, opt always and everywhere for
i) and you will be setting your face against all those possible rule of law
and ‘the expense of this search for intended meaning has simply gotten out
of hand’ type benefits on the other side of the ledger that might tempt one
to lay down such an evidence-limiting rule in the first place. And no doubt
different people would be inclined to strike different bargains between i)
and ii). Indeed, more than that, we know for a certainty that different
jurisdictions did in fact strike different bargains between these two options,
as the comparative historical differences in the allowed use of legislative
history between the United Kingdom and the United States shows.11 Even
Alexander and Prakash would restrict the search for evidence of authors’
intention in cases where that evidence looks likely to be unreliable.12
So far I do not imagine Rick (or Larry for that matter) would disagree.
So here is my attempted provocation or quibble. It goes back to the year
2000 when I wrote a piece for Legal Theory,13 arguing that in any
cost-benefit analysis of when to put limits on the search for evidence of
authors’ intended meaning that we can and we should distinguish statutory
interpretation from constitutional interpretation.14 On this point I have not
changed my mind in the intervening 17 years, though I have apparently
convinced absolutely no one.
Still, my view is that if in the legal realm we are ever in the game of
restricting the search for, or use of, authors’ intentions–because the costs of
that search are outweighed by the benefits of the restriction–then we have
to consider all the costs and benefits. And to my mind they differ as
regards to statutory interpretation and constitutional interpretation. Hence,
11
See Pepper v. Hart [1993] AC 593 (HL) 614 (appeal taken from Eng.) (establishing that it was
“appropriate for the courts to look at Hansard in order to ascertain the intention of the legislators as
expressed in the proceedings on the Bill which has then been enacted in the statutory words requiring to
be construed”). But see Robinson v. Secretary of State for Northern Ireland [2002] UKHL 32, [2002]
NI (HL) 390 [¶ 17] (appeal taken from N. Ir.) (suggesting this case was a “very good illustration of the
sort of case in which the limited departure permitted by the House in Pepper v. Hart . . . cannot
properly be relied upon as an aid to interpretation”); Regina v. Secretary of State for the Environment,
Transport and the Regions, Ex Parte Spath Holme Ltd. [2001] 2 AC 349 (HL) 408 (declining to extend
Pepper v. Hart to this case). My understanding is that in the United States, by contrast, courts have
never adopted an explicit rule governing the use of legislative history for the purposes of statutory
interpretation.
12
See Alexander & Prakash, supra note 10, at 973 (explaining that typically legislative intent is
“highly unreliable”). I would add this gloss to the Alexander/Prakash unreliability concession. If some
class of evidence A were reliable fifty-one percent of the time, and another class of evidence B were
reliable eighty-five percent of the time, then it seems to me that the competing policy goals (including
wanting laws to be relatively clear, not wanting to force litigants to troll through the legislative record
at great expense every time a writ is issued, wanting to keep court costs from being unbelievably
pricey, etcetera) will win out more often against A type evidence than against B type. Not all ‘reliable
evidence’ is equally reliable, in other words, and so not all cost/benefit analyses will pan out the same.
13
James Allan, Constitutional Interpretation v. Statutory Interpretation: Understanding the
Attractions of ‘Original Intent’, 6 LEGAL THEORY 109 (2000).
14
Id. at 125–26.
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to my mind, we can and should distinguish constitutional interpretation
from statutory interpretation in situations where we are considering
restricting the search for authors’ intended meaning on the basis of some
other set of policy-related reasons. It is precisely here that Rick Kay does
not agree; he sees no grounds for distinguishing constitutional and
statutory interpretation in these admittedly peripheral cases. But I do. My
view is that in the situation where we are asking questions about when to
restrict “evidence of authors’ intentions,” that we should (and indeed I
would) be more open to restrictions on that search vis-à-vis statutory
interpretation than constitutional interpretation because the comparative
costs of the lawmaker responding to the interpreter are so much lower with
statutes. Or to make the same point slightly differently, the costs of
sometimes overriding the authoritative and legitimate law-maker based on
some policy-related search-restricting rule are just a lot lower with statutes.
Put differently yet again, we should be much more open to restrictions in
regard to statutes because there is much, much more scope for the
legislature to respond and say “you got our meaning wrong by using these
rule-of-law-enhancing or costs-lowering presumptions. So, we have passed
a new, clearer statute.”15
With constitutional interpretation, by contrast, you basically can
almost never do that; hence we know going in (indeed the top judges doing
the constitutional interpreting know going in) that constitutional
amendments correcting an erroneous imputed meaning’ that results from
some evidence-restricting interpretive rule will not happen, or virtually
never will happen. So the costs of using a “let’s advance rule of law or
keep costs contained” rule will be much higher in constitutional
interpretation. Obversely put, it will bite much less into the legitimate
authority of law regarding statutes, where there is a realistic chance the
legislature will and can reply, than it will as regards to the constitution.
The no real life author, “mindless” law that restricting the search for
authors’ intentions might occasionally throw up has some plausible
prospect of being overridden when it comes to statutes (as the legislature
has some room to respond to court decisions about the meaning of
statutes), but no prospect of happening when it comes to constitutional
interpretation. And that fact has to be thrown into the cost/benefit
calculations. At least I think it does, even if Rick disagrees. Accordingly, I
15

Or, one last time and for those who are sports fans, try this analogy to the NFL. In football
games, in the last two minutes, they will review every play and do the best they can to get the call right.
That’s constitutional interpretation for me. During the rest of the game they will check referees’ calls
when a coach throws down a red flag, but there is a limit of three unsuccessful challenges per coach.
That is statutory interpretation for me. Outside the last two minutes the league is prepared to sacrifice
‘getting the call right’ to other concerns (such as limiting the length of the game, tactical use of flags,
continuity, keeping viewers, etc.).
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am more against limiting the search for the lawmakers’ intended meaning
vis-à-vis written constitutions than I am as regards statutes. That is my
quibble with Rick.
II. THE DEFENCE (OR PERHAPS THREE-QUARTERS DEFENCE)
Rick has written extensively on what (way back in that 1991
Connecticut Journal of International Law article of his) he dubbed
“constitutional fundamentals”16 but what most readers will think of in
H.L.A. Hart’s terminology as a jurisdiction’s “[R]ule of [R]ecognition.”17
This is the label Hart gave to a jurisdiction’s ultimate test of legal validity;
what separates a society’s legal rules from the non-legal rules; what Rick
sometimes calls its “preconstitutional rule,”18 which sits at the point where
law runs out and which can itself be used to give a legal justification for
why, say, some speeding fine or criminal statute or common law tort rule is
valid (i.e., legally valid), but which itself cannot be justified in legal terms.
One can only justify, or criticize, a jurisdiction’s Rule of Recognition in
moral or political terms. There is no legal test above it to which appeal can
be made in the attempt to claim the Rule of Recognition is itself legally
valid or invalid. Legal explanations and justifications have run out.
Of course, this notion of a Rule of Recognition–that from which all a
jurisdiction’s laws ultimately obtain their legal credentials or legitimacy19–
is just a label that Hart invented to help in part conceptualize the concept of
law, or perhaps more aptly the concept of a legal system. And if some
imaginary visitor from Mars were to land on earth at an unknown point of
time and in an unknown jurisdiction how would that visiting Martian
establish what the Rule of Recognition was in that particular jurisdiction,
which might happen to be the Roman Republic, the feudal kingdom of
William the Conqueror, the ancien regime in France, Iran after Khomeini
or North Korea or the United States today? For Hart the answer is wholly
empirical. The Martian would simply look to see what the officials in the
jurisdiction treated as a valid source of law. Yes, this being Hart there will
always be a few penumbral or open texture or highly debatable cases.20
Nevertheless, in the final analysis it depends completely on what happens
to be accepted today as a valid source of law, which is contingent and can
16
Kay, Comparative Constitutional Fundamentals, supra note 2, at 448. For other writings of
Rick on the same topic, see generally RICHARD KAY, THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION AND THE
CONTINUITY OF LAW (2014), as well as Richard Kay, Legal Rhetoric and Revolutionary Change, 7
CARIBBEAN L. REV. 161 (1997), Richard Kay, The Secession Reference and the Limits of Law, 10
OTAGO L. REV. 327 (2003), Richard Kay, Preconstitutional Rules, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 187 (1981), and
Richard Kay, Constituent Authority, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 715 (2011).
17
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 94 (2012).
18
See Kay, Preconstitutional Rules, supra note 16, at 189 (defining preconstitutional rule).
19
See HART, supra note 17, at 94–95 (defining the rule of recognition).
20
Id. at 126.
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change. For Hart, the people whose acceptance matter are that
jurisdiction’s officials. Rick agrees with Hart. I too agree with Hart, and so
with Rick. By contrast, Larry Alexander, also someone I am lucky to be
able to call a friend, disagrees on this very narrow, almost picayune,
point.21
Here I will briefly defend Rick against Larry.22 At the big picture level,
coming to terms with the concept of the Rule of Recognition will throw up
many difficult questions, not least in trying to specify what counts as such
for any particular jurisdiction.23 But the narrow question I focus on here is
whether this source-based empirical test that lets us distinguish legal rules
from non-legal rules is better understood in terms of what officials happen
to accept, or alternatively in wider terms by looking at what citizens as
well as officials would accept. Rick and I say the former. Larry says the
latter.24 Now, to my mind a hugely attractive thing about Hart’s rule-based
concept of law with his account of the rule of recognition, recounted as it is
from the outsider’s vantage,25 is that it can be applied to any legal system,
ever. Application of the Hartian framework is not restricted to some nice
benevolent Western legal system. You can apply it to feudal systems,
Stalinist Russia, North Korea, the United States today, anywhere. The
same goes for Hart’s focus on officials in giving his source-based test of
legal validity. Compare that to Ronald Dworkin, with his theory of law
built out of a theory of how best to interpret, who offers a legal theory of
next to no application in non-democracies, or indeed in any jurisdiction
without an independent (and possibly a common law based) judiciary.
Dworkin’s theory of law can be applied only to a miniscule fraction of the
legal systems the world has seen. Hence this far greater, indeed near
universal, applicability of Hart’s theory is, to my way of thinking, a big
advantage his has over Dworkin’s.
Yet when we turn to how best to conceptualise the Rule of Recognition
Larry points out a problem for Hart. “One would think, however, that
21

Larry Alexander, Constitutional Theories: A Taxonomy and (Implicit) Critique, 51 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 623, 642–43 (2014).
22
The next two paragraphs, in abbreviated form, broadly repeat arguments I made in James Allan,
The Glorious Revolution and the Rule of Recognition, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 509, 519–20 (2015).
23
See Alexander, supra note 21, at 642 (“[W]hat is our rule of recognition? I regard that question
as one of the two most difficult questions in legal philosophy.”); Larry Alexander, Connecting the Rule
of Recognition and Intentionalist Interpretation: An Essay in Honor of Richard Kay, 52 CONN. L. REV
1513 (2021).
24
See Alexander, supra note 23, at 1518 (“[T]he content of the rule of recognition is an empirical
question, it is a complex, messy, difficult empirical question. It will be a function, not just of the
attitudes of a discrete group of officials, who are only officials because of their attitudes, but of the
attitudes and beliefs of a much wider population.”). For additional discussion, see id. at 1520–21.
25
On this and other aspects of the role of vantage in understanding various aspects of law, see
JAMES ALLAN, THE VANTAGE OF LAW: ITS ROLE IN THINKING ABOUT LAW, JUDGING AND BILLS OF
RIGHTS (Ashgate Publ’g Co. 2011).
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citizens as well as officials would have to accept those criteria, lest the
officials would be nothing more than ‘the gunman writ large’ vis-à-vis the
citizens.”26 Put more bluntly, Larry’s gravamen is that any rule of
recognition test focused on what officials accept seems vulnerable, in
plenty of jurisdictions, to being collapsed into the gunman writ large
scenario—the very one Hart tried to evade by moving to a rule-based
concept of law. In other words, the widespread applicability of Hart’s
understanding of the rule of recognition comes at a cost, some would say a
hefty cost. This is Larry’s criticism, and it has force. However, Larry’s
alternative—to look at what criteria “citizens as well as officials” would
accept27—has drawbacks and costs as well. Most importantly, Larry’s
alternative seems to me to take us back to a theory of Dworkin-like levels
of applicability. In a nice, benevolent, democratic, Western jurisdiction,
such as the United States, we can ask what the people (as well as officials)
have accepted as determinative of legal validity. I doubt, though, that such
a question is worth asking in North Korea today. Or was in the Stalinist
Soviet Union. Or in any feudal system ever. Or in any theocracy. Or during
the Roman Empire. Indeed, the list of jurisdictions where such a “what do
citizens accept” question would not be worth asking goes on and on.
Where it would be worth asking is limited to very recent historical times in
liberal democracies. Or at least that seems to me to be true unless one
trades on the ambiguity in the notion of “accept” between (A) “accept
because one largely approves of” and (B) “accept out of fear or other solely
prudential reasons.”28 Hart says you can have a legal system where the
obedience of citizens is largely a function of fear and prudence and even
when the officials who accept and apply the legal rules are similarly
motivated.29 It will not be pleasant. One would not wish to live there. The
similarities with the gunman writ large scenario may be too many for
comfort. But a legal system it will be. And you would discover its Rule of
Recognition by looking to what officials accept as a valid source of law
(quite possibly it being “whatever Mr. Stalin says”), citizens largely having
to accept what they are told or be sent to the gulag.
Accordingly, Larry’s Rule of Recognition focus on what citizens
accept, as well as what officials do, also comes at a cost, an even heftier
one in my view, in terms of its range of application. In other words, there
26

Allan, supra note 21, at 642 (internal footnote omitted). Alexander then reminds readers, in a
footnote, that Hart had attacked Austin’s (and I might add, perhaps indirectly, also Bentham’s)
command theory of law not least because it “could not distinguish laws from the threats of gunmen.”
Id. n.106.
27
See Alexander, supra note 21, at 642.
28
And for what it is worth, in my view, Hart himself at times in The Concept of Law shifts back
and forth between these two understandings of what it is “to accept” a legal rule and to be prepared to
apply it as an official or obey it as a citizen.
29
HART, supra note 17, at 117.
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are problems with both the Hartian and the Alexandrian variants of how
best to conceptualise the Rule of Recognition. No doubt this is just one of
those “pay your money and pick your poison” situations where you are
choosing between least-bad alternatives. However, if forced to choose on
this one, I am with Rick, not Larry. On balance I prefer Hart’s
understanding, though as I have conceded and outlined above, both choices
carry costs as well as benefits.
I hinted above that I was with Rick on this, but possibly only threequarters so. That is because Rick at times suggests that the only officials
whose views and acceptance matters in determining a jurisdiction’s Rule of
Recognition are the top judges.30 If so, that is plainly wrong in all
jurisdictions lacking an independent judiciary and pretty solid democratic
credentials—in other words most jurisdictions that have ever existed!
Indeed, even if we limit our focus to today’s well-established liberal
democracies, say the United States, even there it is not just the views of the
top judges that count. If enough other officials disagree with the judges, the
non-judges are likely eventually to prevail. Perhaps the judges will back
down and soon thereafter over-rule the contentious precedent. Perhaps the
ranks of the judges will gradually be restocked and replaced. But in
empirical terms the test of what counts as a valid legal rule will ultimately
be a function of more than just what the judges think; other officials will
matter too and this is the case even though only the judges have been
afforded the final authoritative power to say what the law happens to be. At
least that is my view, as well as my take on what Hart thought. If Rick (or
at least the early Rick) thinks otherwise, consider my defence of him here
to be but a three-quarters one.
III. THE BIG QUIBBLE
Assume, like Rick and Larry and me, that you believe that originalist
interpretation of the intended meaning variety is “the only game in town if
one purports to be interpreting the Constitution.”31 And assume, too, that
you believe the content of a jurisdiction’s Rule of Recognition to be a
contingent, empirical question of what happens to be accepted as a valid
source of law (be it of the Hartian or Alexandrian variety). If you hold both
those beliefs then, as Larry Alexander powerfully argues in his
contribution to this special issue, you should realise that there is a

30
Kay, Preconstitutional Rules, supra note 16, at 190–91; See Alexander, supra note 23, at 1517.
I equivocate here because subsequent to that 1981 article, Kay offers a much more nuanced view that
suggests it cannot just be judges’ views that determine a jurisdiction’s Rule of Recognition. See also
Richard Kay, Constitutional Change and Wade’s Ultimate Political Fact, 35 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 31,
34 (2016).
31
See Alexander, supra note 23, at 1527.
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connection between those two views or beliefs. And one aspect or feature
of that connection is that when judges in a liberal democracy opt to employ
some other, non-originalist mode of constitutional interpretation they are in
fact, case by case, altering that jurisdiction’s Rule of Recognition (however
minisculely that might happen to be). They are forswearing
constitutionalism, to put it in terms Rick might use.33 Put more bluntly,
such non-originalist judges have effected a small revolution by not being
faithful to the intended meaning of the written constitution. Take away the
empirical search for finding the meaning of what some (considered-to-be)
legitimate and authoritative lawmaking body in the past laid down as
pre-established legal rules, and what you are left with are judges who are
engaged in a law-making exercise. At the constitutional level, that amounts
to a judicial exercise in changing some component of the Rule of
Recognition. It delivers you some degree or other of juristocracy or
kritarchy.
Rick agrees with all that (as does Larry). So far, then, so much
consensus between Rick and me. But what happens if the world we live in
does not happen to look much like one where our top judges are in fact
doing what constitutionalism demands they do? That is, they are not
upholding the intended locked-in meaning laid down by some authoritative
and legitimate lawmaker in the past but instead are treating the document
as a “living Constitution” or are affording it a moral reading or a
Dworkinian best fit one—what then? This is precisely what Rick believes
is the case, as a matter of empirical fact, as regards today’s United States
(and indeed Canada and elsewhere). In one of Rick’s most recent
publications he made this abundantly clear: “[A] fair examination of actual
constitutional judgements is unlikely to convince many observers that
those decisions closely match up with the rules in the constitutional text.”34
32

Id.
For Rick’s defense of constitutionalism, see Kay, American Constitutionalism, supra note 4, at
35−39 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998) (citations omitted). In brief, Rick’s claim is that constitutionalism
amounts to opting to give up some flexibility and the possibility of a more optimal response to change
in favour of more certainty and security, so arguably gaining you more liberty and less likelihood of the
infringement of rights. See id. at 25 (“Constitutional obstacles to state flexibility may be valuable even
in a state premised on the achievement of collective objectives. Long-term social objectives might be
better approximated by adherence to more or less permanent rules than by a series of infinitely
revisable decisions.”). On this mooted choice between greater flexibility in the form of parliamentary
sovereignty-type arrangements and greater locked-in outcomes in the form of a U.S.-type written
constitutional arrangement, I have argued that the former is preferable. See, e.g., James Allan, Why
Politics Matters: A Review of Why Law Matters, 9 JURISPRUDENCE 132, 132, 135 (2018) (arguing that,
despite the risks of being at the “mercy of the legislature,” a parliamentary sovereignty with an
unwritten constitution is ideal); James Allan, Against Written Constitutionalism, 14 OTAGO L. REV.
191, 193 (2015) (arguing that unwritten constitutional-setups are better than written ones).
34
Richard Kay, Democracy, Mixed Government and Judicial Review, in LAW UNDER A
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY 199, 212 (Lisa Burton
Crawford et al. eds., 2019) [hereinafter Kay, Mixed Government and Judicial Review]. See also id. at
33
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And again, I agree with Rick. Gaze around the common law world and, as
he says, top judges look largely (nay, overwhelmingly) to be doing
something very different to what OIM constitutionalists like Rick (and I)
say honest interpretation demands. So still, Rick and I agree.
But here comes my big quibble with Rick. You see, at this point, if you
accept that the preponderance of top judges are doing something that looks
nothing like what both Rick and I (and Larry) think they should be doing
as honest interpreters working in a jurisdiction with constitutionalism at its
core, you might ask a different question. You might ask whether this new
task the top judges are performing can be justified and defended. Rick says
it can.35 He thinks we can understand and then endorse this sort of “living
Constitution” judiciary as a sort of Super Senate, tricameralism-type check
and balance.36 And hence it is here, and only here, that Rick and I part
company. I do not think Rick’s very recent attempt to “reconceptualis[e] . .
. constitutional courts as discretionary decision-makers in a mixed
government”37 is persuasive or successful. So this is my big quibble with
him.
Let me quickly sketch the gist of Rick’s argument in his Mixed
Government and Judicial Review chapter and then say why I find it
unpalatable and unpersuasive. In effect, Rick’s argument there is that
democracy is not all that it is generally cracked up to be. In the first part of
that chapter, Rick (as he puts it) “raise[s] some difficulties associated with
the decision-making competence of voters, difficulties which may have
been exacerbated in recent decades.”38 He reminds readers of the distrust
the American founders had for unconstrained democracy, their worry that
for many people passion would override reason,39 not to mention just how
limited the franchise was back at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution.40 He wonders about voter ignorance and incompetence. If not
quite offering a paean of praise to the role of experts and expert opinion in
modern life, Rick certainly comes down on the side of giving them and it a
big role. He even finishes this first part of his chapter by reminding readers
that Winston Churchill’s famous quote—“that democracy is the worst form
of Government except all those other forms that have been tried from time
213 (“In a significant number of cases, the courts act not on the basis of pre-existing rules but
according to their own evaluation of public welfare. This is implicit in the historical experience of
many jurisdictions and is explicit in much of the academic commentary including the extrajudicial
writing of constitutional judges.”).
35
See Kay, Mixed Government and Judicial Review, supra note 34, at 220–21 (describing
“attributes [of modern constitutional courts] that might qualify them as a valuable counterweight to the
enlarged power of the electorate”).
36
Id. at 220.
37
Id. at 221.
38
Id. at 200.
39
Id. at 202.
40
See id. at 207 (indicating the suspicion of some Founders “regarding democratic government”).
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to time”—was spoken by the great man “in opposition to a [B]ill . . . which
would have reduced the power of the [wholly unelected] House of Lords to
delay legislation passed by the [wholly elected House of] Commons.”41
Then, in the second part of that chapter, Rick offers up his defence of
strong judicial review where it takes place not as part of the traditional
understanding of OIM judging that underlies constitutional government but
rather one with what I would call an aristocratic element with that role now
being filled by the top judges.42 Rick sees this sort of strong judicial review
as resembling a form of “mixed government” with the judges playing the
role of some sort of Super Senate or tricameralism-type check and balance,
and he prefers that to raw, no strong judicial review at all democracy.
Then, in Part III of the chapter, Rick makes clear that for him this
mixed-government type role for judges is a second-best form of judicial
review—not as good as a constitutional state (and indeed, probably not as
good as a properly constituted “mixed government” arrangement).43
That is a rough and ready account of what in the title to this article I
dub Rick’s “Special Kay Defence of Non-Originalist Judges.” You start
with a hefty dollop of skepticism as regards the value of majoritarian
democracy, leaven that by pointing to similar such concerns amongst
America’s Founding Fathers, and then opt for giving a sort of overseeing
role to the lawyerly caste from which judges are chosen rather than opting
to try to rein in the judges and veer towards a more vigorous majoritarian
or New Zealand-style parliamentary sovereignty path (which, once the
OIM constitutional state is forsaken, are really the only two choices left on
the table).
Here is my brief response to Rick’s defence of that sort of
non-originalist judging: first off, the whole “voters are ignorant” grievance
against voters is to my mind far less telling than Rick pre-supposes. Not
long ago, Ilya Somin wrote a whole book setting out this type of grievance
or argument against democratic decision-making.44 I did not find Somin’s
case ultimately to be convincing, as I made plain in my review of that
book.45 The main weaknesses I there noted with these “assertions about the
ignorance and incompetence of the [voting] population”46 inspired attacks
on democracy included: (i) the overblown trust in experts such arguments
41

Id. at 211 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
See id. (stating that popular opinion, while important, is laced with ignorance and must be
checked by those with expertise).
43
Id. at 199, 211, 212–13, 219.
44
See ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY SMALLER GOVERNMENT IS
SMARTER 224 (2d ed. 2016) (making the “central argument . . . that widespread political ignorance . . .
should lower our confidence in the effectiveness of the modern democratic state as a tool for making
important policy decisions”).
45
James Allan, Do Judges Know Best?, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 479, 492 (2017).
46
Kay, Mixed Government and Judicial Review, supra note 34, at 202.
42
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exhibit, without much if any empirical support for that trust; (ii) the flaws
inherent in trying to pigeonhole social policy differences in society into
mere questions of “fact” rather than ones where people come to the
particular debate with different underlying sentiments or values or
preferences––thereby simply assuming away Humean-type claims that we
humans live in a fact/value dichotomy world and hence implicitly elevating
the importance of expertise when it comes to the sort of issues that reach a
top U.S.-style written constitution and bill of rights common law court
(issues like who can marry, when life should be understood as beginning,
how to treat those claiming to be refugees, the most desirable scope for
protecting speech, what limits to put on gun ownership, how best to draw
district or electoral boundaries, the list going on and on into the distance);47
and (iii) the insouciance about accountability concerns displayed by such
attacks on democracy, remembering that one of the core virtues of
democracy is that it lets us “throw the bums out” while in a Benthamite
way,48 going some small distance towards aligning the interests of the
elected politicians (who, to keep their jobs, need the votes of more than
half of those who go to the polls) with those of the voters––an imperfect
alignment, no doubt, but perhaps a least-bad one and better than just
trusting judges (or anyone else) who cannot be removed from office.49
47
And it is not just the assumption that differences of opinion in society are overwhelmingly
“fact-based” rather than “value-based” (contra David Hume-type thinking); also seemingly at work
here is a needed implicit acceptance that Kant’s account of human reason is preferable to Hume’s. See,
e.g., id. at 5–6 (discussing voters’ reasoning for their political choices). I much prefer Hume here to
Kant. See JAMES ALLAN, A SCEPTICAL THEORY OF MORALITY AND LAW 1–4 (1998) (discussing
Hume’s philosophy).
48
Bentham’s sticks and carrots, incentive-based understanding of democracy is most clearly seen
in his early work. See, e.g., PHILIP SCHOFIELD, UTILITY AND DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL THOUGHT
OF JEREMY BENTHAM 78–79, 109–11, 138–39, 199–200 (2006) (illustrating Bentham’s incentive-based
understanding of democracy). See also R. Cranford Pratt, The Benthamite Theory of Democracy, 21
CANADIAN J. ECON. & POL. SCI. 20, 20 (1955) (discussing Bentham’s theory of democracy).
49
Which, after all, is the sentiment that lay behind Churchill’s famous quote that “democracy is
the worst form of Government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”
Kay, Mixed Government and Judicial Review, supra note 34, at 14 (citation omitted). Now Rick
mentions this Churchillian quote and then reminds the reader that it was spoken in opposition to a Bill
that “would have reduced the power of the [wholly unelected] House of Lords to delay legislation
passed by the [wholly elected House of] Commons.” Id. at 14. But to put that in further context still,
the Parliament Act 1911 had limited the unelected House of Lords’ power to delay Money Bills to only
one month and non-Money Bills to two years (assuming passage by the House of Commons in three
successive sessions). The Parliament Act 1949 reduced the latter of those delaying powers in the hands
of the unelected House of Lords down to one year (assuming passage by the House of Commons in two
successive sessions). Now Churchill made his quote about democracy as the least-bad system, as Rick
says, in the context of opposing the shrinking of the Upper House’s delaying power by one year. Id. at
14. My response would be this. We must remember the context. This is a British system under which
the Prime Minister can at any time threaten to have (and if pushed actually have) the Monarch appoint
as many new Lords as needed to enable passage of any Bill being blocked by the Lords. Indeed, this
was exactly what Prime Minister Asquith threatened to do to force through passage of the Parliament
Act 1911. Again, this was recently mooted or threatened if the Lords became difficult over Brexit
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Secondly, any defence of what amounts to an aristocratic element in
one’s constitutional arrangements (and be clear that on Rick’s “mixed
government,” tricameralism-like defence of strong judicial review that will
be precisely the role that top judges play) always looks better––or so say
I—when one is himself part of that aristocracy. Take away the widespread
view that the judges are interpreting and enforcing rules that have been
legitimately locked-in and laid down in the past and my bet is that the vast
preponderance of citizens (the ones not part of this lawyerly caste that will
be deciding based solely on what they happen to think best) will find this a
rather unappetising prospect. Antonin Scalia certainly agreed with me on
this point:
The people are not stupid. When the primary function of the
Supreme Court was thought to be interpretation of text and
identification of legal tradition, the people were content to
have justices selected primarily on the basis of legal ability.
But they know that Harvard Law School, Stanford Law
School—yea, even Yale Law School—do not make a man or
woman any more qualified to determine whether there ought
to be a right to abortion, or to homosexual conduct, or to
suicide, than Joe Six-Pack.50
Robert Nagel does too.51
This leads to a third problem for Rick’s “mixed government,”
tricameralism-like defence of strong judicial review. You could never sell
it to people upfront and openly. Rick more or less concedes as much when
he says:
If constitutional courts were to respond to this problem [i.e.,
the disjunction between what these courts say they are doing
and what they actually do] by candidly aligning their rhetoric
legislation. Hence, Churchill’s support for keeping the Lords’ delaying power at a maximum of two
years rather than just one year hardly looks in any way like support for a “mixed government” strong
judicial review set-up under which unelected ex-lawyer judges can and do regularly gainsay the elected
branches on a vast array of matters where there is nothing the latter can do in response. Put differently,
I do not think Rick can plausibly call in aid Mr. Churchill, even in the most enervated way, as some
sort of implicit supporter of his “mixed government.” See James Allan, The Paradox of Sovereignty:
Jackson and the Hunt for a New Rule of Recognition?, 18 KING’S L.J. 1, 2 (2007) (discussing a leading
British constitutional case that centered on the Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949).
50
Antonin Scalia, Romancing the Constitution: Interpretation as Invention, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE CHARTER ERA 343 (Grant Huscroft & Ian Brodie eds., 2004).
51
See ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 6–7 (1989) (explaining the skepticism surrounding the idea that constitutional
principles are consistent throughout time). Nagel does wonder, though, why anyone would expect those
trained to find uncertainty and loopholes in rules to be good at upholding constitutionalism’s
“locked-in” values. Bob Nagel made this clear to me in an email correspondence on file with the
author.
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with their practice, a different problem would arise. Such an
approach would subvert the legitimacy that these institutions
enjoy in the eyes of the public.52
Hence Rick sees his “reconceptualisation of constitutional courts as
discretionary decision-makers in a mixed government [as] a post hoc
explanation.”53 In more straightforward terms, the Special Kay defence of
non-originalist judges requires the public to be kept in the dark. If you put
such a role for the judiciary to all of us voters in a referendum or at some
sort of constitutional convention it would be defeated and be defeated
badly. Of course, I concede that in theory best consequences can diverge
from the path of honesty and of openness and of any realistic ability to sell
the proposal to one’s fellow citizens. But having conceded that, I also think
most of us would be more than a little skeptical of the worth of
constitutional arrangements that can never honestly be revealed to one’s
countrymen. For me there is just too much whiff of “elitism piled on
aristocracy” about such arrangements. It smacks to me of the European
Union and much of the (to me, inevitable) voter backlash flowing from the
paucity of democratic credentials of that supranational body’s institutional
arrangements.54 So that is my big quibble with Rick. Give me majoritarian
democracy any day55 over a set-up with unelected top judges who are
openly acting as a checking-and-balancing third chamber holding up the
decisions of the elected branches against their own policy druthers, and
having the last word power to gainsay anything they happen not to like
(although admittedly the fact that this is what they are actually doing might
have to be kept secret from the uninitiated). Of course, both Rick and I
agree that this “mixed government” type role for judges, this
reconceptualization of how one might defend and justify what all of us can
observe many of them are in fact doing today, is a second best form of
judicial review. We agree it flat out is not as good as “the constitutional
state.” Indeed, we agree it is not even a particularly good type of “mixed
52

Kay, Mixed Government and Judicial Review, supra note 34, at 25.
Id. at 24.
54
I detail some of this in James Allan, Democracy, Liberalism, and Brexit, 39 CARDOZO L. REV.
879, 900–04 (2018).
55
The defense of which has been a consistent theme of my work. James Allan, Bills of Rights and
Judicial Power––A Liberal’s Quandary, 16 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 337, 337–38 (1996); James Allan
& Grant Huscroft, Constitutional Rights Coming Home to Roost? Rights Internationalism in American
Courts, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 57–59 (2006); James Allan, Portia, Bassanio or Dick the Butcher?
Constraining Judges in the Twenty-First Century, 17 KING’S L.J. 1, 25–26 (2006); James Allan &
Michael Kirby, A Public Conversation on Constitutionalism and the Judiciary Between Professor
James Allan and the Hon. Michael Kirby AC CMG, 33 MELB. U. L. REV. 1032, 1037–39 (2009); James
Allan, Statutory Bills of Rights: You Read Words In, You Read Words Out, You Take Parliament’s
Clear Intention and You Shake It All About, in THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
SCEPTICAL ESSAYS 108–10 (Tom Campbell et al. eds., 2011); JAMES ALLAN, DEMOCRACY IN
DECLINE: STEPS IN THE WRONG DIRECTION, at viii–x (2014).
53
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government” arrangement. Where we differ, at core, is that I am a
noticeably bigger fan of democracy than Rick, by which I mean a thin,
majoritarian understanding of democracy.56
But I had to look hard to be able to pick that fight with my good friend
Rick. In the greater scheme of things, there is just so much overlap in our
views. I was lucky that all those years ago my then-Dean decided to
co-host a legal theory conference that led to my meeting the man we are
honouring with this special law review issue.

56
I defend that thin, procedural understanding of democracy in James Allan, Thin Beats Fat Yet
Again−Conceptions of Democracy, 25 LAW & PHIL. 533, 533 (2006). Rick argues for a much more
morally pregnant understanding of democracy. Kay, Mixed Government and Judicial Review, supra
note 34, at 14–16, 20–21.

